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SECTION ONE

FIRST DAY
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Roanoke, Virginia
July 29, 1975

1.
Your client, Sam Driver, brings to you a motion for judgment which was filed and served on him on July 17, 1975, the body
of which reads as follows:
lo
The piaintiff, Roscoe Fleetwood, has duly qualified as administrator of the estate of Jim Wallace, deceased, in the Circuit Court of the City of Charlottesville,
on the 8th day of' July, 1975.
2.
Plaintiff moves the Court for a judgment against
the defendant Sam Driver for the sum of $75,830 for the
wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent caused by the said
defendant in that said defendant did negligently operate a
motor vehicle between Rugby Road and Vinegar Hill, in the
City of Charlottesville, Virginia, causing said motor
vehicle to strike and kill plaintiff's decedent who was
crossing Rugby Road.
Driver has

fi~ed

a demurrer to the motion for judgment.

How should the Court rule on the demurrer?
2.
Jane Horseman commenced an action against Horse Van Carrier,
Inc. in the Circuit Court of Clarke County, Virginia, to recover damages in the sum of $100,000 for serious personal injuries sustained
by plaintiff as a result of a collision between a car operated by her
and a horse van operated by the defendant. l~t the conclusion.of
all of the evidence and after receiving the instructions of the Court,
counsel for plaintiff and defendant argued the case. During the
course of argument counsel for plaintiff said to the jury: "All Jane
Horseman asks you gentlemen to do when you retire to your jury room
is to apply the Golden Rule - 'Do unto her as you wish that you would
be done.'" Counsel for defendant promptly objected to that statement
by counsel for the plaintiff and, out of the hearing of the jury,
moved the Court to declare a mistrial, or in lieu thereof instruct
the jury to disregard the argument as improper. The Court overruled
the motion for a mistrial, holding that the argument was proper. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $65,000.
Shortly thereafter counsel for defendant moved the trial court to set
the verdict aside claiming that the Court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a mistrial, or, in the alternative,in failing to
instruct the jury to disregard the argument as improper. The trial
court overruled the motion and exception was noted. Defendant filed
a petition with the Supreme Court of Virginia for a writ of error and
the writ was granted. The only assignment of error was the action of
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the Court in refusing to grant a mistrial, or, in lieu thereof, in
failing to instruct the jury to disregard the argument as improper.
Should the Supreme Court affirm the trial court
or reverse that Court and remand the case for a
new trial?
3.
William Houseman, a citizen of Tennessee, on May 7, 1975,
sued John Gardener, a citizen of Virginia, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, to obtain specific
performance of an allege<! contract for the sale of a farm, "Green
Acres," which was owned\by Gardener and was situate in Albemarle
County, Virginia, and to recover damages in the sum of $25,000 for
the alleged breach of the contract by Gardener. Gardener filed an
answer in which he merely denied the averments contained in the complaint, i.e., he denied that he entered into a contract with Houseman
by which he agreed to sell the farm, "Green Acres," and he further
denied that he was guilty of a breach of contract, as charged in the
complaint, which would entitle Houseman to recover damages. No other
pleadings were filed by the plaintiff or defendant. During the trial
of the case Houseman proved: that on May 5, 1971, he and Gardener.
orally agreed that Gardener would sell to Houseman "Green Acres" for
the sum of $150,000; that a deed for the farm would be delivered to
Houseman by Gardener the 1st day of June, 1971, and that the purchase
price would be paid on the date of delivery of the deed; that Gardener
refused to deliver a deed for the farm on June 1, 1971, as agreed,
although Houseman then tendered payment of $150,000 to Gardener by
certified check; that on a number of occasions thereafter Houseman
demanded that Gardener deliver him a deed and accept payment of the
purchase price but Gardener refused in each instance; and that Houseman had sustained a loss of $25,000 because he had been denied possession of the farm and was unaLle to make a profit from the operation thereof. At the conclusion of the evidence offered by Houseman,
Gardener moved the Court for summary judgment on the grounds (a) that
the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (b) that the
contract was oral and therefore unenforceable because of the statute
of frauds.
How should the Court rule on each ground of the
motion?
4.
Jimmy Q-iriyaway was indicted in the Circuit Court of Prince
William County, Virginia, on a charge of breaking and entering with
the intent to commit larceny. Promptly upon the return of the indictment, Carryaway was arraigned on the indictment and entered a plea of
not guilty. He was tried on the indictment at the next regular
term of the Court, was found guilty and sentenced to five years in
the state penitentiary. After serving one year in the state peniten-
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tiary, Carryaway, by his attorney, filed a petition in the Circuit
Court of Prince William County praying that a writ of habeas corpus
be issued and that he be discharged from custody. In his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus Carryaway charged that during the trial
on the indictment the Court erred in admitting, over his objection,
the result of a lie detector test, and that the Court also, over his
objection, admitted into evidence hearsay evidence that was material
in establishing his guilt of the offense charged in the indictment.
At the hearing on the petition, the petitioner proved that he had
submitted to a lie detector test and that the result tended to prove
his guilt. He also proved that the witness introduced by the Commonwealth was permitted to testify that he heard Joe Booze say that
he saw the defendant open a closed window of the house that he was
charged with entering and that he saw him enter the house and return
through the window with some valuable silverware. The petitioner
also proved at that hearing that his attorney strongly objected to
the admission of all of that evidence, and that the Court overruled
the objection. The Commonwealth offered no evidence at the hearing
on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus.
On a motion by the Attorney for the Commonwealth
to strike the petitioner's evidence and to deny
the writ of habeas corpus, hew should the Court
rule?
5.
Herbert Nickels obtained a judgment for $5,000 against
Robert Payne in the Circuit Court of Mathews County, Virginia. Robert
Payne and his brother John were tenants in conunon of sixty acres of
timberland in Mathews County which realty had a fair market value of
$30,000. Shortly after his judgment was docketed, Nickels brought a
suit in equity in the Circuit Court of Mathews County against Robert
and John Payne to partition the timberland. The bill recited the
judgment against Robert Payne, recited that Robert and John Payne were
tenants in common of the timberland, recited that rents and profits
from the timberland would not satisfy the lien of the judgment within
five years, prayed that the timberland be partitioned by sale, and
further prayed that Nickels' judgment be satisfied out of that portion
of the sale price allotted to Robert Payne. After the parties were at
issue, a stipulation was entered into and filed in the cause by
Nickels, Robert Payne and John Payne. By the stipulation, it was
agreed that Robert Payne had marketable personal property in Mathews
County worth $6,000. John Payne thereupon filed a motion that the
Court dismiss Nickelsg bill for partition asserting as the grounds
therefor: (a) that Nickels was not entitled to relief by a partition
of the timberland until he had exhausted his remedy to satisfy his
judgment out of the personal property of Robert Payne, and (b} that
Nickels could not properly proceed to satisfy his judgment by partition of the timberland because John Payne was a co-owner of the
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realty and was not a debtor of Nickels.
Should the Court sustain John Payne's motion on
either,or both, of the grounds asserted?
6.
Top-Service Taxi Corp. is engaged in business in the City
of Richmond. Top-Service employs no drivers and owns no taxicabs,
but receives orders for service from prospective passengers. It
puts its sign "Top-Service Taxi Corp." on cabs which are owned and
operated by independent drivers, each of whom pays Top-Service a
mileage fee for each passenger Top-Service refers to the driver.
After receiving a telephone call for cab service from Cecil Jones,
Top-Service caused one of the independent drivers to pick him up.
While transporting Jones, the driver carelessly collided with
Walter Brown's automobile, damaging it and seriously injuring Jones.
What liability, if any, does Top-Service have for:
(a)

the injuries to Jones; and

(b)

the damage to Brown's automobile.

7.
John Lacy is a resident of Knoxville. Tennessee, and is
the owner of approximately 5,000 acres of land situated in the New
River Valley in the State of Virginia. In 1973 the General Assembly
of Virginia enacted a statute authorizing the State Engineer to
construct a dam on New River at a point one mile downstream from
the land of Lacy, the completed dam to be of such height as to flood
more than one-half of Lacy's land. The construction of the dam has
been completed and Lacy 7 s land has been flooded. Although demanded
by Lacy, the Treasurer of the State of Virginia has refused to pay
Lacy for resulting damage on the ground that the statute makes nq
provision for compensation to those adversely affected by the dam.
Lacy has brought an action against the Treasurer and the State of
Virginia in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginiao His complaint alleges the foregoing faats, and seeks
damages in the amount of $300,000. The Treasurer and the State of
Virginia have moved to dismiss Lacy's complaint on the ground that
it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
How should the Court rule on the motion?
8.
Thomas Swan rented a safety box in the vault of First State
Bank in the City of Fairfax. On December 27, 1974 Swan went to the
Bank to deposit stock certificates in his safety box. After being
admitted to the vault, and after depositing his certificates, Swan
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found lying on the floor of the vault a negotiable bearer bond of
the City of Richmond in the face amount of $5,000 payable on June
30, 19810 Swan picked up the bond and, seeing it did not recite the
name of the owner, left th!= vault and went directly to the office of
the President of the Bank.· There he told the President what had occurred, and delivered the bond to the President only after being
promised by the latter that, should the owner not call for the bond
or become known by June 30, 1975, the Bank would redeliver the bond
to Swan. On July 1, 1975, Swan learned that the owner of the bond
had not called for it or become known to the Bank. Swan then asked
that the bond be returned to him. The Bank refused to do so, saying
it would continue to hold the bond until it learned the identity of
the owner. Swan has now brought an action in detinue against the
Bank in the Circuit Court of the City of Fairfax to recover possession
of the bond. The President of the Bank consults you and, after reciting the foregoing facts, asks whether the Bank has the right to
retain possession of the bond.
What should your advice be?
9.
Delta Construction Company entered into a contract in July
1974 to erect a building for Grove Department Store for $100,000 to
be paid when the building was completed. The contract contained a_
binding provision requiring that any disputes between the parties
would be submitted to arbitration. By May 15, 1975, Delta had completed fifty percent of the work on the building. At that time a
dispute arose regarding subsurface conditions. Delta w3lked off the
project and refused to participate in arbitration. Shortly thereafter Third Party secured a judgment against Delta for $10,000. When
Delta failed to pay the judgment, Third Party sought to collect it
from Grove through a garnishment proceeding on the theory that Delta
would be entitled to collect considerably more from Grove than the
$10,000 Delta owed Third Party.
Is Third Party entitled to collect $10,000
from Grove in the garnishment proceeding?
10.
Paul alleged in his bill of complaint filed in the Circuit
Court of Warren County, Virginia, that he had entered into a "supposed marriage" with Winona upon her representation that she had
been lawfully divorced from her former husband, Joe: that following
the ceremony, and in the honest belief that they were lawfully married, Paul purchased certain real property in Warren County and
caused it to be conveyed to him and his supposed wife as tenants by
the entirety with the right of survivorship; that subsequently he
learned that Winona had not been lawfully divorced from her former
husband; and that although she had obtained a decree of divorce from
her former husband in the Circuit Court of Henry County, Virginia,
that decree was void for want of jurisdiction because neither Winona
nor her husband had been domiciled in, or a bona fide resident of,
the State of Virginia for at least six months next preceding the
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commencement of the suit as required by the Virginia Code. Paul
prayed that the "supposed marriage" be declared a nullity and that
Winona be compelled to convey to him all of her interest in the
real property.
Winona filed a demurrer in which she asserted that Paul's
suit against her was a collateral attack on the decree of divorce
by the Circuit Court of Henry County and that Paul had no legal right
to make such an attack since he was a stranger to the divorce proceedings. The Chancellor sustained the demurrer and entered a decree
dismissing the complaint.
In an appeal by Paul, how should the Supreme Court
of Virginia rule?

